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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL
ACTS, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES-HOME RULE CITIES LACK
AUTHORITY To CREATE RANDOM FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
Litten v. City qfFargo, involved an action brought to enjoin the
City of Fargo from submitting to its electorate the question of
whether Fargo should change its form of government.' The topic of
governmental change had been introduced pursuant to article 12 of
Fargo's home rule charter.3 An injunction was granted by the Cass
County district court, and the City of Fargo appealed. 4 The
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that home rule cities lack
authority to create random forms of government. 5 Litten v. City qf
Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980).
Litten involved a traditional home rule approach to the concept
of self-government that was set forth in section 130 of the North
Dakota Constitution, which is currently codified in article VII,
section 1 of the North Dakota Constitution.6 Traditionally, self-
1. 294 N. W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980).
2. Litten v. City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628, 630 (N.D. 1980).
3. Id. (citing FARGO, N.D., CHARTER art. 12). Article 12 provides as follows:
Changes in the orin of governnwnm may be proposed by motion of the Governing
Body or may be proposecd by petitions hearing the signatures of c ualified city electors
ccqual in nunber of at least fifteen percent if the entire vote cast for executive officer of
the City at the preceding regular City Election in which said executive officer was
suhject to election. Proposals for changing the form of government shall be voted upon
at the next Citywicle election, provided at least thirty clays has lapsed after the motion
of the Governing Body or the filing of pctitions with the City Auditor.
FARGO, N.D., CHARTER art. 12, para. 1. See Litten v. City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d at 630.
4. Litten v. City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d at 630.
5. Id at 634.
6. N.D. Co NsT. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CoNsT. art. VII. 1). Section 130 of
the North Dakota Constitution provides:
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government stood for self-autonomous rule in harmony with and
subject to the general laws of the state.7
While the state legislatures devolved limited local power to
municipalities, the state judiciaries distinguished local power from
legislative power,8 applying "Dillon's Rule" to charters and
statutes alike. It was the opinion of Dillon, a prominent nineteenth
century commentator on local government, that municipalities
were in all matters subordinate to the state. 9 Therefore, Dillon's
Rule states that local powers are only those powers expressly
devolved upon municipalities by legislative grant.' 0 Applied to
municipalities, Dillon's Rule forced localities either to prove an ex-
press devolution of power, or not to assume it."
Early and unsuccessful challenges to Dillon's Rule were at-
tempted by nineteenth century commentators, McQuillin and
Cooley. 12 The idea of home rule, or local governments functioning
Except in the case of home rule cities and villages as provided in this section the
legislative assembly shall provide by general law for the organization of municipal
corporations, restricting their powers as to levying taxes and assessments, borrowing
money, and contracting debts. Money raised by taxation, loan or assessment for any
purpose shall not be diverted to any other purpose except by authority of law.
The legislative assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of home rule in
cities and villages. It may authorize such cities and villages to exercise all or a portion
of any power or function which the legislative assembly has power to devolve upon a
nonhome rule city or village by its own home rule charter and which is not denied to
all home rule cities and villages by statute. The legislative assembly shall not be
restricted in granting of home rule powers to home rule cities and villages by Section
183 of this constitution.
Id. Section 130 adopts the Fordham approach to home rule in which municipalities receive a "full
grant of power subject to limitation.'" Schwabacher, The Seamless Web: A Critical Analysis of the
Municipal Corporations Article of the North Dakota Constitution and the Proposed Amendment of it in Light of
Other Variants of the Fordham Formula for Home Rule, 44 N.D.L. REV. 370, 374 (1968). Fordham's new
formula home rule reverses the traditional approach to home rule in which municipalities received
only those powers specifically granted. Id. at 373.
7. E. MCQUILIiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.14 (3d rev. ed. 1971). "The
functions of the colonial borough were quite restricted, as powers granted were narrow." Id. See id,
1.33.
8. Frug, The CityAsA Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1111 (1980).
9. Id. at 1109. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373 n. 10. "Dillon's Rule
indicates that a municipality possesses only those powers which are granted expressly by its charter,
state constitution, or statutes; necessarily or fairly implied from such express powers; or essential to
the existence of the municipality.'" Lang v. City of Cavalier, 59 N.D. 75, 84, 228 N.W.819, 822
(1930); see Murphy v. City of Bismarck, 109 N.W.2d 635, 642-43 (N.D. 1961). North Dakota case
law, prior to the enactment of and amendment to section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution,
viewed municipalities in the light of Dillon's Rule.
10. Lang v. City ofCavalier, 59 N.D. 75. 84, 228 N.W. 819, 822 (1930). The Supreme Court of
North Dakota has described the rule as follows: "A municipal corporation . . . is purely a creature of
statute. It takes its powers fron the statutes which give it life, and has none which are not either
expressly or impliedly conferred thereby or essential to effectuate the purpose of its creation.'" Id.
11. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 8, at 1112 n. 227 (citing .
DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ch. 1, 9 (1st ed. 1872)). "The courts,
too, have duties, the most important of which is to require these corporations, in all cases, to show a
plain and clear grant tor the authority they assume to exercise." Id. Dillon reasoned that the courts
must "require these corporations, in all cases, to show a plain and clear grant for the authority they
assume to exercise. ... Id. (citing. .DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ch. 1, § 9(1lst ed. 1872)).
12. Early McQuillin works rebutted Dillon. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 8, at
I 111. Revised McQuillin works became more comfortable with Dillon's Rule. Id. at 1115.
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independently of the state regarding local matters, did not become
popular until the late nineteenth century, however. 13 The purpose
of home rule, it was argued, was twofold: 1) to free the legislature
from the burden of municipal problems; and 2) to free
municipalities from the burden of centralized rule.' 4 The un-
derlying theory was that local matters could be regulated better by
the people directly affected within the locality than by central
authority of all the people within the state. 
15
The goal was not realized, 16 however, due to continued fear of
municipalities becoming sovereign entities with feudalistic anarchy
resulting.' 7 In the majority of states, Dillon's Rule prevailed
through.judicial construction, if not constitutional provision. 8
On November 8, 1966, the people of North Dakota amended
section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution 19 to provide for what
one author has dubbed "permissive home rule. ", 20 Prior to passage
of this 84th amendment 21 to the North Dakota Constitution, A. B.
Villanueva 22 predicted great latitude in the concept of self-
government in North Dakota cities if the amendment were ratified.
Villanueva foresaw the very proposition that would subsequently
stimulate the litigation in Litten:23 the self autonomy of home rule
13. Id. at 1115. "There was in the late nineteenth century. however, a political challenge to
state control of cities launched under the rallying cr of 'home ruc'.' " Id.
14. See MCQiUILLIN, THE LAV OF MNIcIPAI. CORPORA'TIONS. supra not( 7, it § 1.40.
15. Id. § 1.37. See id, 5 1.43. "Unhampered local control permits prompt action in dealing with
fresh municipal problems." Id. Thus, it would seem that rurally oriented legislatures were deemed to
be ill-equipped to combat the problems of growing municipalities with effectual or punctual
efficiency. Id.
16. See Frug, The Citv as a Legal Concept, supra note 8, at 1116.
Late nineteenth century and early twentieth i'entury rfitnters in t t.acthieved
the enactmeii of a bewildering variety of constituti tl a itendments des igned to
protect city autonomyv. These constitutional amendnments. however, hi iled to achieve
their ob'iective . 1 he reason for their failure lies in the continuing liberal
unwvillingness to tolerate an intrmnediate entity that appears to threaten the interests
ofboth the state andl the individual.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1112. "Indeed, although Dillon's vision of' society may be gone forever. Dillon's
statement of the law of rnunicipal corpora tions, stripped Of its ideological Underpinnings, largely
remains intact today." Id. -[T]he interests of the state and the individual have bet'n upheld at the
expense of city power. even in the face f' supposedly restrictive constitutional aniendtients. " Id. a(
1117.
19. The text of section 130 appears at supra note 6.
20. Schwabacher. The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 389. "[Tihe legislature is directed to provide
procedures for municipalities to adopt home rule charters and authorized to devolve substantive
powers .... IT he constitution does not devolve power directly, but merely permits the legislature to
grant home rule power. " Id.
21. 1967 N.D. Scss. Laws ch. 510. The 84th amendment tt the North Dakota Constiution was
derived from Senate Concurrent Resolution C. See 1965 N.D. Sess. laws ch. 480.
22. Villanueva, Towards Home Rule.for North Dakota Cities, 42 N.D.L_ R~v. 164 (1966). At the
time referred to therein, Villanueva was Associate Professor if Political Science, Moorhead State
College, and a member of the Fargo Mayor's Task Force on City Government. He held the following
degrees: A.B., 1953. University of Manila, M.P.A., 1956. Utniversity of Phillipines. Ph.D.. 1961,
Univcrsit' ofMinnesota.
23. 294 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980).
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cities concerning creative alterations in their governmental forms .
2
1
After section 130 was amended, another commentator,
Christopher C. Schwabacher, 25 recognized and underscored an
arguendo interpretation of section 130 similar to Villanueva's.
26
The argument, viewed favorably by Villanueva and cautiously
by Schwabacher, derives from a factual interpretation of section
130. The argument begins with the traditional premise that the
legislature has full power over the people and laws of the state,
27
subject only to the state or federal constitutions. 28  Next, the
legislature has to honor the charter of a home rule municipality; if a
24. See Villanueva, Towards Home Rule for North Dakota Cities, supra note 22, at 164-65 (footnotes
omitted).
If the institution of home rule takes root in North Dakota, local governments will no
longer have to go to the state legislature in Bismarck everytime they want to alter their
form of government or to perform new functions to meet the demands of their citizens.
If, for example, the citizens want to have a city government combining the merits of an
elected executive leadership with expertise in municipal administration, they can
incorporate a strong mayor-council form of government with a municipal
4dministrator appointed by and responsible to the mayor. Such form of government is
unfortunately not found in the North Dakota Century Code. About all that one finds
in this Code are governmental structures that are inadequate to respond to changes i
municipal life.
Id.
25. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 370. At the time referred to herein,
Schwabacher was Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. He held the following
degrees: B.A. Harvard, 1963, L.L.B., 1966; L.L.M., New York University, 1967.
26. See id. at 385. Although recognizing the interpretation as a possibility,
Schwabacher appears to caveat against such an interpretation not judicially tempered.
"Creative interpretation by the judiciary compensates for the legislature's failure to be omniscient.,
for its failure to foresee all possible actions of subordinate units which are contrary to the interest of
the state." Id. Recall that the traditional standard of review has the courts looking to the enabling
statutes to see what powers or functions were expressly or impliedly devolved therein. See.J. DILLON,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ch. 1, § 9 (1st ed. 1872). But this approach is
totally contrary to the underlying theory of new formula home rule. Under Fordham's new formula
home rule, North Dakota courts should view section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution as
the applicable standard of review for actions of home rule cities. See Schwabacher, The Seamless
Web, supra note 6, at 373. The test under new formula home rule, according to a literal reading of
section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution, is not whether a power or function was expressly
devolved, but whether a power or function was expressly denied. Id. at 374-75. If the power or
function was not denied, the second step of the test is whether the municipality, acting with
legislative force and effect under section 130, has acted in accordance with the state and federal
constitutions. Id. The statutes should only be checked judicially to determine if the power or
functions was denied. Id. As to such denial of a power or function, a schism exists between
Schwabacher and the comment to the American Municipal Association's model drafted by Dean
Fordham. The comment to the AMA model, after which section 130 of the North Dakota
Constitution was patterned, favors express denial: "[Niew formula home rule] emphatically reverses
the old strict-constructionist presumption against the existence of municipal power and, so long as
the legislature does not expressly deny a particular power, renders unnecessary petitioning the
legislature for enabling legislation." Id. at 386 (citing FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE COMMENT No. 3, 20-21 (1953) [hereinafter cited as FORDHAM] (emphasis
added)). Schwabacher, however, takes issue with Fordham's comment that the function or power
must be expressly denied. "The mere word 'denied' can be construed as including implied denial
incident to conflict between state law and local ordinance or incident to state law which 'occupies the
field' in order to achieve uniformity or for sonic other regulatory purpose." Schwabacher, The
Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 386. Thus, it would seem that Schwabacher's interpretation tends to be
more compatible with traditional home rule approaches revisited than does the interpretation set
forth by Fordham and the American Municipal Association.
27. See MCQIlLI IN, THE LAW OF MUJNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at § 1.36.
28. Id. § 4.06.
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home rule charter denies a given power or function, the legislature
cannot force it upon the municipality. 29 Finally, by statute the
legislature cannot deny powers or functions to home rule cities
unless it denies those powers or functions to all home rule cities.30
Under this interpretation of section 130, the powers devolved
upon home rule cities and villages are those powers which the
legislature would have if it acted in its own behalf with regard to
non-home rule charters. 31  Using powers and functions thus
devolved upon it, the home rule city acts toward itself with full
legislative force, effect, and authority, .just as if the legislature itself
had acted.3 2 This interpretation of section 130 suggests that those
powers not devolved are to be reserved to the legislature by
statute.33
Conversely, those powers devolved include those areas in
which the legislature is silent but would have power to act upon
non-home rule charters. 34 Thus, if a city has not denied the power
29. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at § 9.08. If the state
legislature needs no authority to act when it acts on its own power subject to state and federal
constitutional limitations, when it devolves a power, it devolves legislative force and effect to the
recipient city until such time as the legislature revokes the power of all home rule cities. See id. See also
N.D. CONST. art. VI, 5 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1). Section 130 of the
North Dakota Constitution provides that "[Tihe legislative assembly . . . may authorize [home rule]
cities and villages to exercise all or a portion of any power or function . . . which is not denied to all
home rule cities and villages by statute." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, arguablv. when the legislature
delegates its authority to act, it does so completely, thereby granting to home rule cities legislative
authority when acting toward themselves.
33. N.D. CoNsT. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1). The effect, it
would appear, is to grant full power to the home rule municipality subject to limitation. See id. This
does not create a sovereign within a sovereign. "As the people of the state may amend the
constitution a state within a state is not created." MCQUILLIN, THE LA'W' OF MINICIPA
CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at § 9.08a. Thus, a power or function not being specifically denied, the
home rule city arguably acts toward itself with legislative force and effect until the legislature revokes
the power or function by specific denial or until the people amend the constitution. Id. But see
Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 385. Schwabacher appears to caveat against such a
free reign of municipal authority without Judicial temperament. "Creative interpretation by the
judiciary compensates for the legislature's failure to be omniscient, for its failure to foresee all
possible actions of subordinate units which are contrary to the interest of the state." Id. Yet a literal
interpretation of section 130 would appear to mandate that the statutes conveying home rule
authority to municipalities be checked judicially only to see if the power of function sought to be
exercised was denied. See supra note 6 for the text of section 130.
34. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, 5 1). The text of
section 130 appears at supra note 6. According to section 130, it is reasonable to conclude that home
rule citites can be denied the authority of legislative action, when they act unto themselves, only in
situations in which the legislature has denied that authority to home rule cities en bloc. See id. This
argument recognizes that the legislature is not required to devolve all or any portion of a substantive
power or function that is within its authority to devolve. But when it does devolve power, it arguably
devolves all power within its authority to devolve. See MCQUIIIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPA.
CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at §§ 7.36 & 4.06. The legislature has power to create, abolish or alter
municipal powers at will, subject only to state and federal constitutional limitations. A strong
argument is presented that the body which can create, abolish, and alter powers at will can also
devolve powers at will, subject only to constitutional restrictions. "The whole point of the new
formula approach is that the allocation of power is a political or policy question best resolved by the
legislature which is the policy-setting branch of government." Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra
note 6, at 376. Under the argument, a home rule city need not accept a power sought to be devolved,
for the city can deny such power or function by its home rule charter. See N.D. CONST. art. Vi, § 130
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or function by its home rule charter,3 5 if the legislature has not
denied the power or function by statute to home rule cities en bloc,
36
and if the power or function is one that the legislature could exer-
cise in its own stead upon non-home rule cities,37 then the home
rule city has the power or function regardless of whether that power
is enumerated in the enabling statutes. 38 Therefore, it is quite
possible that when the legislature devolves power pertaining to
municipal affairs under section 130, it devolves it all, subject to its
right to reserve any part thereof.39 This is in direct contrast to
Dillon's Rule and a break with the traditional view defining local
power as only that power specifically devolved by the legislature.
40
The role of the courts under traditional home rule approaches
was to locate individual conflicts on the lineal spectrum of the state-
local dichotomy.41 But new ideas create new roles. The new role
of the courts arguably contemplated within section 130 of the North
Dakota Constitution is to review a city's actions under its home
rule charter as these same courts would review any act of the state
legislature42 - no more, or less. It is therefore possible that this
(currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1). Although cities may have received devolved
powers, the legislature, by statute, may reserve unto itself any specific power or portion thereof. Id.
35. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Wright, The Legislative/Administrative Dichotomy and the Use qf the Initiative and Referendum in
a North Dakota Home Rule City, 51 N.D.L. REV. 855, 866 (1975). An illustrative application of the
analysis states:
In reviewing Section 130 . . . there is no mention made of the power. . . . Thus, it
would appear that there is no constitutional bar to the use of the Ipower] .... Since
Ichapter 40-05.11 does not specifically discuss the power . . . it would appear ... that
the legislative assembly left the decision ... up to the individual city .... The city ...
in adopting a home rule charter .. provided for the Ipower].
Id. Thus, under the illustration, the city apparently has the power.
39. Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373-74. Schwabacher observes the
following:
Virtually all new formula home rule provisions adopt the idea introduced by Dean
Fordham in his American Municipal Association Model: local units are given a full
grant of governmental power subject only to limitation in the constitution, state
statutes, or local charter. This full grant of power is designed to eliminate the
relevance of Dillon's Rule to litigation concerning the validity of the exercise of local
government power.
Id. See also Frug, The City as a Legal Conept, supra note 8, at 1057. Frug suggests that, in addition to
federal and state governments, the city acting unto itself should be viewed as a third entity of
government rather than as a mere agency of the state. Id.
40. Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373. "Dean Fordham and other
commentators criticize traditional home rule, primarily because of Dillon's Rule and the
questionable distinction between matters of state and local concern, and suggest that new formula
home rule eliminates these difficulties." Id. "The semantics and legal fictions of exclusive allocations
of powers . . . suggest boundaries where there are no boundaries, absolute distinctions where there
are only relative ones." Ylvisaker, Some Criteria .for Proper Areal Division of Governmental Powers, in
AREAL AND POWER 35 (A. Maass ed. 1959), quoted in Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at
371-72.
41. ,Se Frug. The Citt, asa Lekal Concep t. supra note 8. at 1109-12.
42. See N.D. CONST. art. VI. 5 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art VII, § 1). Under new
liirtnuta honie ru', ciiis receive i full grant of power subiect to limitatton. Accordingly, they act
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new judicial role is not to decide cases under the traditional state-
local dichotomy, but to determine whether a city, acting under
auspices of its home rule charter, has violated any constitutional
provision. 43 If a city has not violated any constitutional provision,
its action under its home rule charter arguably must stand with the
force and effect of a legislative act until such time as the legislature,
not the judiciary, exercises its right to revoke the power or function
by statute.
4 4
The allocation of power to municipalities thus becomes a
political question for the legislature. 45  However, under the
devolution test 46 considered by Schwabacher, the judicial question
becomes whether under section 130 of the North Dakota Con-
stitution the legislature had the power to devolve the function or
power claimed by a municipality. 47 The question derives from the
hypothesis that a legislative state, such as North Dakota, may only
be able to devolve those powers and functions under municipalities
that relate strictly to municipal affairs. 48 Thus, using the devolution
test, judicial review of a home rule municipality's actions under
section 13049 results, at least partially, in the same state-local
dichotomy that North Dakota's new idea in home rule seeks to
avoid. Perhaps for this reason Schwabacher denounced the
devolution provision in the constitution.5 ° Notwithstanding, the
provision exists for North Dakotans.
Against this general background the arena was set for
litigation in North Dakota between the champions of Dillon's Rule
and the champions of new formula home rule under section 130.
Litten v. City of Fargo was the result.
5
1
unto themselves with legislative force and effect. This should arguably affect judicial review so as to
give the home rule city the sane judicial deflerence the legisla,are enioys. SO' asO McQUtIIN. THE.
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, § 9.08a. "As the people of the state may amend the
constitution a state within a state is not created." Id.
43. See supra note 42.
44. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, 5 1). The
legislature must revoke a city's power to act by statute. Id. On revocation of a power or function, see
the discussion accompanying supra note 33. Like the standard for review of legislative enactments,
under new formula home rule the judiciary can revoke the city's power or function only if such power
or function is prohibited by the state or federal constitution. See MCQUILLI , THE LAW' OF MUNCIPA.
CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at §§ 1.36. 4.06, 9.08a. The*?efore, the new formula home rule city's
actions unto itself carry legislative force and effect. Id. 9.08.
45. Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 376.
46. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6. The devolution test asks what powers the
state may constitutionally devolve. Its application is two-fold. First, it considers whether the
legislature has acted to devolve a power or function in accordance with state and federal
constitutions. Second, by virtue of the first consideration, the test assures that home rule cities will
receive only the powers that are constitutionally authorized, with the implication that those cities will
exercise the devolved power or function in a constitutional manner. Id.
47. See supra notes 34 & 46; infra note 102.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 376. 'There is no .justification for such a
devolution provision in the constitution." Id.
51. 294 N.W.2d 628(N.D. 1980).
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Litten developed as an effort to enjoin the City of Fargo from
holding an election concerning a new form of city government. 52
Petitions filed in accord with article 12 of Fargo's Limited Home
Rule Charter 3 requested that the electorate of Fargo be allowed to
vote on a unique form of city government consisting of an eleven
member council. 54 The Fargo Board of Commissioners scheduled
the question for the next city-wide election. 55 Resisting these plans
to place the question on the public ballot, the plaintiff, Litten, con-
tended in effect that Dillon's Rule still prevailed in North Dakota,
notwithstanding amended section 130 of the North Dakota Con-
stitution; thus, home rule cities, according to Litten, possessed only
those powers and functions specifically granted by statute.5 6 The
52. Id. at 629-30. "Intervenor.jacque Stockman appealed from a Cass County district court
order dated 22 Oct 1979 enjoining the City from calling a special election on 6 Nov 1979 or any other
date based upon the petitions filed for a change in form of city government." Id.
53. Id. Article 12 of the Limited Home Rule Charter of the City of Fargo reads as follows:
Changes in the form of government may be proposed by motion of the Governing
Body or may be proposed by petitions bearing the signatures of qualified City electors
equal in number to at least fifteen per cent of the entire vote cast for executive officer of
the City at the preceding regular City Election in which said executive officer was
subject to election. Proposals for changing the form of government shall be voted upon
at the next City-wide election, provided at least thirty days has lapsed after the motion
of the Governing Body or the filing of petitions with the City Auditor.
Id. FARGO, N.D., CHARTER art. 12, para. 1.
54. 294 N.W.2d at 630. The petitions contained the following language:
'A PETITION TO ESTABLISH REPRESENTATIVE MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE CITY OF FARGO
We the undersigned qualified electors of the City of Fargo request that the following
change in the form of government question be submitted to the voters of Fargo at the
next city-wide election, as provided in Article 12 of the Home Rule Charter of the City
of Fargo:
Change from Commission to Council System ofGovernment
Shall the City of Fargo change from its organization under the commission system of
government and become a city under the council form of government with eleven
members?'
Id. The plaintiffs/appellees in Litten noted in their trial brief that section 40-04-10 of the North
Dakota Century Code allows for ballot forms to ask whether the city shall have a "modern council
form of government with an eleven man council" or a "council form of government." Brief for
Plaintiff at 12, Litten v. City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980). There is no question in the
general statute providing for a "council form of government with eleven members." Id. at 13. The
plaintiffs/appellees argued that the petition is ambiguous on its face because the "eleven members"
provision denotes a modern council form of government while the words "council form" purport to
propose just that. Id. at 17. They argued that the difference between the two is the gross difference
between a strong mayor system under the council form and a weak mayor system under the modern
council form. Id. They concluded, therefore, that the form of government set forth in the petition is a
crossbreed not allowed by general statutory law. Id. at 18. Note, however, that this crossbreed form
of government is precisely what Villanueva envisioned as a benefit of home rule in North Dakota. See
Villanueva, Towards Home Rule for North Dakota Cities, supra note 22.
55. This complied with article 12 of Fargo's home rule charter. The text of article 12 is set forth
at supra note 3 and 294 N.W.2d at 630.
56. Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 35, Litten v. City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980).
The plaintiffs/appellees brief to the supreme court concluded as follows:
Home rule cities of North Dakota remain agencies of the State. They are not free
to act in matters wherein they have not been given enabling authority by statute,
especially where such action would contradict detailed and extensive schemes of state
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defendant, City of Fargo, countered that Fargo's Limited Home
Rule Charter granted under the enabling legislation of the state
57
superseded the provisions of general law58 concerning the forms of
government a city may have and the procedures enabling such
change.5 9 The City of Fargo urged that in accordance with section
130 of the North Dakota Constitution, any action done under a
municipality's home rule charter must stand with the force and ef-
fect of a legislative act until such time as the legislature, not the
judiciary, exercises its right to revoke the power or function by
statute. 60 Therefore, Fargo's exercise of a home rule charter power
to create an innovative form of city government must be con-
stitutionally recognized as having full legislative force and effect.
61
Not to recognize such force and effect, argued Fargo, would
vitiate section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution as amended by
the people of North Dakota in 1966.62 Thus, the underlying issue in
Litten63 was whether home rule under section 130 of the North
regulation. Systems of city government available to all North Dakota cities as well as
the petition and election processes whereby the cities may elect to change from one
system to another, are matters of statewide concern. Statewide legislation in this field
preempts and renders invalid the conflicting city charters and ordinances.
Article 12 of the Limited Home Rule Charter of the City of Fargo is in direct
conflict with a detailed and extensive scheme of statewide regulation. The 1979
petition process, attempting to comply only with Article 12 of the Limited Home Rule
Charter and clearly not complying with the requirements of state law is illegal.
Id.
57. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 40-05.1 (Supp. 1979).
58. Id. ch. 40-05.
59. Brief for Intervenor/Appellant.jacque Stockman at 55, Litten v. City of Fargo 294 N.W.2d
628 (N.D. 1980). The intervenor/appellant's brief to the Supreme Court concluded as follows:
There is no factual dispute that the City of Fargo has proceeded under its charter: the
question is, "Does the Home Rule Charter in this case supersede the provisions of
Title 40 referred to in Plaintiffs Complaint?"
We respectfully assert that under the constitutional authorization that the
legislature may devolve powers upon a home rule charter city not denied by its charter
or by statute - that the City of Fargo may initiate the procedures under Article 12 of
its charter relating to changing its form of government. To reason otherwise - Would
be to nullify the constitutional authorization for home rule as set out at Article VI,
Section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution.
Id.
60. Id. at 54.
Applying the doctrine of supersession, as set forth in the enabling legislation, the
provisions of Fargo's Home Rule Charter relating to the changing of the form of
government shall supersede "any law of the State in conflict therewith.'' .. [Tlhe
legislature may devolve powers upon a home rule charter city not denied by its charter
or by statute ... To reason otherwise would be to nullifly the const itu itional
authorization for home rule as set out at Article VI, Section 130 of the North Dakota
Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 56. The petitioned-for election "process is in conformity with the procedure of the City
of Fargo's Home Rule Charter and . . . is recognized as an extension sf the leislative process by our
North Dakota Courts." Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 54. See supra note 60.
63. 294 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980). It would appear that the issue the court addressed in Litten
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Dakota Constitution would be interpreted liberally or
traditionally.
64
The Litten court, it would seem, addressed the underlying
question obscurely. While signaling an inclination towards
traditionalism in home rule, 65 the court appeared to avoid any
material discussion of the substance of section 130.66
Supporting its contention that powers devolved to home rule
cities are powers enumerated by statute, the court cited City of
Fargo, Cass County v. Harwood Township67 and drew conclusions
therefrom. The rule of Harwood, paraphrased and given general ap-
plication by the Litten court, is that local power must consist of
either an express or necessarily implied grant of power. 68 The court
held that absent such express devolution of power by the
legislature, a city, whether home rule or otherwise, will be
presumed governed by general laws applicable to all cities. 69
Concerning the statutory provision of section 40-05.1-05 of the
North Dakota Century Code allowing a home rule city's ordinance
to supersede state law when there is conflict, the Litten court ruled
that it applied only to powers specifically devolved to home rule
cities under section 40-05.1-06 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 0 The Litten court further asserted that the holding in City qf
Fargo v. Fahrlander, 71 allowing a home rule city's ordinance to super-
was whether the City of Fargo, acting under Article 12 of its Limited House Rule Charter, would be
allowed to change its form of government to any form it desired. It appears, however, that the
fundamental issue in Litten goes beyond such a narrow question and queries whether the North
Dakota judicial approach to home rule will be shaped by new formula home rule or by traditional
home rule. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, § I). The text
of section 130 appears supra at note 6.
64. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 376. A result similar to that reached
under traditional home rule could be reached through the devolution test. Id. A more liberal
interpretation could be reached through Fordham's approach. Id. at 374.
65. 294 N.W.2d at 631. "Whatever powers home rule cities may have are based upon statutory
provisions." Id. It would appear from the textual usage of this statement in Lilten that the court drew
the traditional assumption stated by Dillon's Rule. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6,
at 373 n. 10. Dillon's Rule states that local powers are limited to those powers specifically devolved
on home rule cities. Id.
66. 294 N.W.2d at 631.
67. 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977).
68. 294 N.W.2d at 632.
[In Harwood] we basically concluded that a city, whether home rule or otherwise, has
no inherent power except as expressly granted or necessarily implied from the grant by
the legislature and without such grant it has no more right than any other corporation
to condemn property. This statement generally applies to any activity of the city.
Id.
69. Id. "If the authority or power to enact an ordinance on a specific sub'ject is not found in § 40-
05.1-06 or in Ch. 40-05. 1, or in some other comparable statute, then a strong presumption exists that
the city will be governed by the laws generally applicable to cities. " Id.
70. Id. "It becomes somewhat evident that the language in § 40-05.1-05, NDCC, permitting a
city ordinance to supersede state law where there is a conflict has reference only to those powers given
to the city under § 40-05.1-06, because in certain instances the legislature specifically required
compliance with the special laws. " Id.
71. 199 N.W.2d 30 (N.D. 1972).
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sede provisions of a conflicting state law,7 2 did not imply that state
law would always be subordinate to conflicting home rule city or-
dinances. 
7 3
Litten cited four cases7 4 in which the North Dakota Supreme
Court evidenced a concern for avoiding remote interpretations of
legislative statutes. 75 The court suggested that if a home rule city
was authorized to establish any form of government for itself, it
could adopt a monolithic form for itself.76 The court, without ap-
pearing to defer to the facial implications of section 130 of the
North Dakota Constitution, was skeptical about whether the
legislature would grant such authority to home rule cities. 
77
The authority granted to home rule cities according to Litten,
however, is more restrictive than even a traditional home rule
reading of section 130.78 The court set forth concurrent standards
for the delegation of any powers or functions to home rule
municipalities. 79 Not only must the power or function claimed by a
home rule city be delegated by statute, it must also be incorporated
72. City of Fargo v. Fahrlander, 199 NW.2d 30, 35 (N.D. 1972).
73. 294 N.W.2d at 631.
74. Id. at 633. The court cited the cases as follows:
Our court has consistently held that the statutes must be construed to avoid ludicrous
and absurd results. State v. Mees, 272 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1978); State v. .ell ff 251
N.W.2d I (N.D. 1977); Pollock v. McKenzie County Public School District No. 1, 221
N.W.2d 521 (N.D. 1974); and Hu'hes v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 236 N.W.2d
870 (N.D. 1975).
Id.
75. 294 N.W.2d at 633.
76. Id. "If the contentions of the appellant were correct, the city could adopt 'a one man rule'
for a form of government." Id.
77. Id. "With our background and history . . . we doubt that the legislature would even grant
such authority." Id. It is arguable that the court did not clearly distinguish between the question of
remote manifestations of an otherwise valid interpretation of a statute, and the question of whether
the statutory interpretation is itself remote. It would further appear that the court's contention
ignores the argument that the legislature could in fact create such an option and make it available to
all cities under general law. See MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at
§ 1.21. "Unless restricted by the state constitution, the state has plenary power to create, alter, or
abolish at pleasure any or all local governmental areas." Id. It is uncertain what the judicial reaction
would be if the legislature were to create such an option for city government under its general laws
for all municipalities. Certainly the standard of review would be higher, for the state legislature needs
no authority to act when it acts on its own power subject to state and federal constitutions. Id. S 4.03.
Furthermore, it is well-established in constitutional law that legislative action carries a presumption
of constitutionality. Id. Finally, it is possible that acting under a facial interpretation of section 130,
the legislature did grant such authority to home rule cities. See N.D. CoNsT. art. VI, § 130 (currently
codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, S 1). The text of section 130 appears supra at note 6.
78. 294 N.W.2d at 632. The court stated:
It is not sufficient merely to examine the subsections of § 40-05.1-06, NDCC, to
determine what powers the city of Fargo, a home rule city, may have. To make this
determination it is also necessary to review the charter to determine if those powers are
included in the charter, and if they are it then becomes necessary to determine if they
were implemented by an ordinance.
79. Id.
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in the city's home rule charter and implemented by ordinance.80
Absent the concurrence of all three, a municipality cannot claim
the power or function. The court relied on section 40-05.1-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code as support. 81
The Litten court found that even if the City of Fargo had the
statutory authority to randomly change its form of government, it
had not implemented that authority by city ordinance. 82 The court
held that, as to change in form of government, the general law
8 3
will prevail, notwithstanding the lenient and liberal wording of the
state constitution, the statutes, and Fargo's home rule charter. 84
Litten's concern to avoid remote results8 5 suggests that no
noticable difference would have occurred in the court's holding
if the City of Fargo had implemented the authority to change its
form of government within its city ordinances. 86 Therefore, the
80. Id. The court stated:
It therefore follows that if the powers are not stated in the charter, or if they are stated
in the charter but are not implemented by ordinance, the home rule city may not avail
itself of the powers enumerated in § 40-05.1-06, NDCC, but would be governed by the
statutes applicable generally to all cities-
id
Fhe icourt fuirther stated:
IT he City of Fargo had the authority to change its form of government to any form it
desired by virtue of subsections (4) and (6) of § 40-05.1-06, NDCC. But be that as it
may, from our examination it appears that subsections (4) and (6) of § 40-05.1-06
were not implemented by any, city ordinance so as to put into operation the provisions
of § 40-05.1-05, NDCC. Consequently they may not be relied upon as authority to
change the form of government of the city to any form desired or to be determined
later by the city.
Id. at 633.
81. Id- at 632. The court stated:
This conclusion is confirmed by the last unnumbered paragraph of § 40-05.1-06,
which in part, provides as follows:
"The statutes of the state of North Dakota, so far as applicable, shall continue
to apply to home rule cities, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such
cities or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters."
1d.
82. Id. at 633. The court noted:
Neither party has called to oui attention any city ordinance which provides for a
change of form of government and our research does not disclose that the city of Fargo
has adopted an ordinance setting forth either the procedures to be followed in
changing the city form of government or the forms of government that may be used by
the city of Fargo.
Id.
83. N.D. CENT. Co1Ech. 40-05 (Supp. 1979).
84. 294 N.W.2d at 634. The court stated: "We conclude that in the matter of changing the form
of government the legislature intended home rule cities to be governed by those laws applying to
cities generally." Id.
85. Id. at 633.
86. Id. The court's language regarding ordinances suggests the possibility that had Fargo
implemented section 40-05.1-06(4) by ordinance, a different result might have been obtained. Id.
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court's decision, on what it perceived to be the issue 87 of the case
evidences the judicial approach toward what appears to be the
underlying or fundamental issue.
88
Thus, after rendering brief credence to the permissive nature
of new formula home rule in North Dakota under section 130,89 the
court conversely held that local power is that power specifically
devolved and no more. 90 At its worst, Litten vitiates section 130 of
the North Dakota Constitution. 91 At its best, Litten appears to
reduce section 130 to less than it arguably purports to stand for on
its face, at least under the factual circumstances of the case.
92
Read literally, section 130 provides that the legislature may
authorize a municipality to exercise powers and functions not
denied by its home rule charter and not denied by statute. 93 Thus,
section 130 on its face provides that whatever powers or functions
home rule cities may note have are based upon statutory provisions.
This is arguably not the equivalent of the court's stating, without at
least a substantial accompanying exploration and explanation of
87. Id. at 630. "May a home rule city. independent of the general laws relating to cities, select
its own forrn of government and decree its own procedure for changing the form of goverrinent ...
or is the city limitel in its selection to the procedures anc forms of governient set out by the
legislture?'' Id.
88. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. \1I. 1). In lieu of
section 130. the underlying issue of Litten appears to be whether the North Dakota judicial
approach to home rule witll be shaped by new tormula home rule as set trth in the North Dakota
Constitution or by iraditional home rule as exemplified in Dillon's Rule. Id.
89- 294 N.XV .2d at 631. The court stated:
Section 130, as amended and approved in 1966. basically removed limitations
previously placed upon the legislature relating to cities, directed the legislature to
enact lass's authorizing home rule, and permitted the legislature to devolve certain
powers Upon home rule cities. This constitutional provision in itself Icoes not grantt a ny
powers to home rule cities. Whatever piwers home rule cities may have are based
upon statutory provisions.
Id.
90, Id, at 632. The court stated that [til' the authority or power to enact an ordinance on a
specific sUi 'ect is not founcl in § 40-05.1-06 or in Ch. 40-05. 1, or in some other comparable statute,
then i a strong presumption exists that the city will be governed b' the laws generally applicable to
cities. " Id.
91. N.D. CONST. art. \11, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII. § 1). Indeed, the
City of Fargo argued that any municipality action clone pursuant to a home rule charter should be
deemed to have legislative force and effect. See Brief for Intervenor/Appellant at 54, Litten v. City of
Fargo, 294 NAV.2d 628 (N.D. 1980). It would appear that the clear language of section 130 that the
legislature may "authorize such cities and villages to exercise all or a portion of any power or
function . . . which is not denied to such city or village by its own home rule charter and which is not
denied to all home cities and villag'es by statute, - N.D. COST. art. VI. 5 130 (currently codified at N.D.
CONST. art. VII, § I) (emphasis added), allows for the single interpretation that when the legislature
acts to devolve a power relating to municipal government upon home rule cities. it devolves all such
powers except those which it expressly reserves to itself by statute. But see 294 N.W.2d at 631 (Ltten
court's interpretation of section 130 appears to be just the opposite).
92. 294 N.W.2d at 634. The court concluded "that in the matter of changing the form of
governrment the legislature intended home rule cities to be governed by those laws applying to cities
generally." Id. See N.D. CONST. art VI, § 130 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1). Yet
it is possible that if Litten is narrowly construed to apply only to changes in the form of municipal
government, a future court may, with different facts presented, have an opportunity to read section
130 according to its plain meaning.
93. N.D. CoNsr. art. VI, § 130 (currently coclified at N.D. CoNsT. art. VII, 1). The text of
section 130 appears supra at note 6.
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section 130, that "[w]hatever powers home rule cities have are
based upon statutory provisions." ' 94 The difference between the
two statements is the difference between whether, when the
legislature devolves power, it devolves it all subject to its rights to
reserve any part thereof or whether it reserves all power subject
only to those portions specifically devolved. On this distinction
rests the outcome of the underlying issue in the case. 95 On this
point rests the location of certain penumbral 96 powers and functions
clearly affecting municipal affairs yet not clearly denied or granted
by statute. On this matter rests the standard of judicial review 97 by
which a given case will be determined.
Notwithstanding, the Litten court moved from its brief,
unexplained assumption that a city's home rule powers must be
based on statutory provisions, 98 to a discussion of potentially
applicable statutes in North Dakota. The format appeared to have
been set. The statutes must have provided for the devolution of
power or such power was deemed to have been retained by the
legislature. What apparently remained for the court was to review
the statutes, and to discover that a change in the form of city
government has not been provided under chapter 40-05.1 entitled
Home Rule in Cities.
99
94. 294 N.W.2d at 631.
95. See supra note 87.
96. 294 N.W.2d at 630. The penumbral power at issue in Litten was that of changing the form of
city government. It was provided for in article 12 of Fargo's Limited Home Rule Charter. Id. at 633.
See FARGO, N.D., CHARTER art. 12. But the power in question was, by statute, neither clearly denied,
under a new formula home rule approach, or granted, under a traditional home rule approach. 294
N.W.2d at 632.
97. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373-74. Schwabacher discusses the two
possible standards of judicial review. The traditional standard asks "whether a local government
unit is authorized to exercise power." Id. The Fordham approach asks whether a local government
unit is forbidden to exercise power "by its own charter or the state constitution or statute. " Id.
98. Such an assumption is arguably incorrect. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6,
at 374.
99. 294 N.W.2d at 634-35 (Vande Walle. j., concurring). Actually, even under this traditional
approach a fairly convincing argument can be made that authority to change the form of city
government is granted to home rule cities. The concurring opinion in Litten recognizes this argument
and explains it well. Id. Nevertheless, the court held otherwise:
The supersession provision set out in § 40-05.1-05, NDCC, has limited and qualified
application.
It becomes somewhat evident that the language in S 40-05.1-05, NDCC,
permitting a city ordinance to supersede state law where there is a conflict has
reference only to those powers given to the city under § 40-05.1-06, because in certain
instances the legislature specifically required compliance with the special laws ...
This clearly indicates that the legislature intended the cities to exercise broad plenary
powers in those items specified under § 40-05.1-06, except where specifically provided
that these powers may be exercised only by conforming or complying with state law. It
necessarily follows that in order to determine what broad powers were given to home
rule cities we must examine the various provisions of § 40-05.1-06. If the authority or
power to enact an ordinance on a specific sublect is not found in S 40-05.1-06 or in Ch.
40-05.1, or some other comparable statute, then a strong presumption exists that the
city will be governed by the laws generally applicable to cities.
ld. at 631-32. In support of its analysis, the court offered examples of exceptions where chapter 40-
05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that general state law shall prevail over a city's own
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In establishing its holding that home rule powers and functions
must be based on statutory provisions, 100 it is possible that Litten
did not render Harwoodo1i its full contextual interpretation. The
dispute in Harwood was over which zoning ordinance should apply,
as between a city and a bordering township, to land located within
the township but owned by the city. Therefore, Harwood is not
relevant to Litten, for Harwood comes within the zoning exception
set forth in section 40-05.1-06 (11) of the North Dakota Century
Code.10 2 Thus, the home rule question is really not an issue in
Harwood because the dispute is statutorily reserved to and governed
by the general laws of the state. Perhaps this is because Harwood
goes beyond the area of purely municipal affairs and involves a
conflict between co-equal powers, mandating a need for general
state law to control. 103 Since home rule is not in issue within the
context of Harwood, the statement made therein as to "expressly
granted or necessarily implied ' 10 4 powers cannot be safely relied
upon to resolve an issue when home rule is involved. To do so is to
apply a rule set forth in the context of general legislative law to an
issue set forth under the home rule exception to that general law.
Litten's fear that a home rule city could "adopt a 'one man
rule' form of government' 1 0 5 if that city were given all power
subject only to reservation by the legislature seems to ignore an
important argument well founded in section 130. The argument is
that the legislature could in fact create such an option and make it
available to all cities under general law. 106 If the legislature could
home rule provisions. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 40-05.1 (Supp. 1979)). However, because the
'legislature specifically required compliance." with the general state laws, this could also be taken to
mean that the legislature has by statute denied the power or function to the home rule cities while
reserving it to the state. Id. Although the court applied the traditional approach of looking to the
statutes for a grant of power, the Fordham approach of looking for a denial of power works equally
well. See Schwabacher, TheSeamle. 4,'eb, supra note 6, at 373-74.
100. 294 N.W.2d at 632. The Litten court reasoned that "Ithe power and authority of a city
must be found either in a constitutional or statutory provision." Id. (citing City of Fargo v'.
Harwood, 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1977)).
101. 294 N.W.2d at 632 (citing 256 N.W.2d at 694).
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05.1-06(11) (Supp. 1979). Section 40-05.1-06(11) provides for the
following: "To provide for zoning, planning, and subdivision of public or private property within
the city limits; to provide for such zoning, planning, and subdivision of' public or private property
outside the city limits as may be permitted by state law." Id.
103. City of Fargo v. Harwood, 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.I). 1977). "The two entities appear to
possess relatively co-equal authority regarding this dispute. '" Id. See atso Schwabacher. Ike Seamless
Web, supra note 6, at 736. Although Schwabacher suggests thait the "divolutiot test is apparenlv no t
a territorial limitation," yet it is quite possible that the corllict betwein co-equals dlionstrates a
second usage of the devolution test. /d. As applied to thr coitllicts bitwen iuniipalities, thi
devolution test would tend to ensute the rectitude of hotie rule cities: Thus. rnot 0tV tdoes it pr, vide
constitutional validation of substantivi powers or functions ilaiteiled It a i h It uIll(' CiV, hilt itt
addition, it implies an areal restrictin where co-equals are concerned. Id. The desolutinlest thus
underscores a home rule municipality's autonomy, while simuliiemisl contitiing lie i ity
territorially. Id.
104. 294 N.W.2d at 632 (citing Harwood, 256 N.W.2d at 697).
105. 294 N.W.2d at 633.
106. McQuILIIN, THE LAW O MINICIPAt CORPORATIONS, .Upa note 7, at § 1.21. "Unless
restricted by the state constitution, the staie has plenary power to create, alter, or abolish at pleasure
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create such an option, it seems to follow that a home rule city acting
with the force and effect of legislative authority could also create
such an option. 107
The extreme possibility of one man rule' 08 suggested by the
Litten court is rendered a bit less awesome when viewed against the
foil of a home rule city acting with legislative force and effect. 0 9
Such reflective foil, however, requires an interpretation of section
130 of the North Dakota Constitution not decreed in Litten."
0
Rather, Litten, without explanation concerning the substance
therein, has taken a traditional home rule reading of section 130.1'1
As support, Litten relies upon a desire to avoid that which is
potentially absurd or ludicrous. 1
2
Litten interpreted section 40-05.1-06 to mean that a power
must not only be delegated to a home rule city by statute, but it
must be incorporated in the city's home rule charter and imple-
mented by ordinance. 113 However, the last paragraph of section 40-
05.1-06 does not say "charter... and by ordinance.... " Instead,
it reads "charters . . . or by ordinance. ",4 Since the
statute says "or" not "and, ''15 it is arguable that section 40-05.1-
06 relied on by the court is not as restrictive as the court suggests.
"Or" clearly does not require the concurrence of charter and
any or all local governmental areas." Id. McQuillin noted:
It frequently has been broadly stated in the decisions of the courts of the country that
legislative authority over municipal corporations exists, except as limited by the
federal and state constitutions, or that legislative control exists as to civil, political and
governmental powers, or the like, and such legislative power is often referred to as
plenary, supreme, absolute, complete, or unlimited.
Id. S 4.03 (footnotes omitted). "Unless prohibited by the constitution, the legislature may change the
form of local government. ... " Id. S 4.03a.
107. See Villanueva, Towards Home Rule for North Dakota Cities, supra note 24, at 164-65. "1 Llocal
governments will no longer have to go to the state legislature in Bismarck every time they want to
alter their form of government or to perform new functions to meet the demands of citizens." Id.
108. 294 N.W.2d at 633.
109. See Villanueva, Towards Home Rule.for North Dakota Cities, supra note 24, at 164-65. See also
Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373-74. For a discussion of a home rule city acting
with legislative force and effect regarding powers devolved to it under home rule legislation, see supra
note 32.
110. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373. The interpretation required would
be that "introduced by Dean Fordham in his American Municipal Association Model: local units are
given a full grant of governmental power sublect only to limitation in the constitution, state statues,
or local charter. Id. (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. at 374. The traditional view of home rule, as exemplified by Dillon's Rule, is that
municipalities are given only those powers specifically devolved legislatively by statute, and no more.
Id.
112. 294 N.W.2d at 633.
113. Id. at 632.
114. N.D. CENT. COnE § 40-05.1-06 (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). Section 40-05.1-06
provides as follows: "The statutes of the state of North Dakota, so far as applicable, shall continue to
apply to home rule cities, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities or by ordinance
passed pursuant to such charters." Id. (emphasis added). The first paragraph of section 40-05.1-06
of the North Dakota Century Code uses the word "and." Id. Taken in isolation, this would support
the court's interpretation. The last unnumbered paragraph of the same section, however, clearly
says "or." Id. Thus, at the most, section 40-05.1-06 stipulates "and/or." and therefore, arguably
cannot support the court's contention.
115. Id. § 40-05.1-06. See supra note 113.
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ordinance, but allows one or the other to suffice. Therefore, by the
literal wording of the statute, not every charter provision needs an
enabling ordinance for that provision to supersede conflicting state
laws. Rather, some provisions will supersede absent ordinances
pertaining thereto. Article 12 of Fargo's Limited Home Rule
Charter is such a provision. Yet the Litten court found otherwise
and used the statute just discussed to support its conclusion. 116
The impact of Litten will depend upon whether future courts
give the case a broad or a narrow reading." 7 Theoretically, a
narrow reading of the case will be self-containing, allowing for the
possibility of future holdings that are more consistent with the
liberal wording of section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution.
A broad reading may have diverse effects. Home rule
municipalities will follow a traditional line of looking to the
legislature for specifically enumerated powers or functions,
notwithstanding section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution. The
enumerated powers or functions must touch concurrently upon
three elements to be possessed by a home rule municipality: the
power or function must be enumerated within the enabling statute,
incorporated into the home rule charter, and implemented by local
ordinance. The courts will reserve the right to vitiate any provision
of the charter or relevant ordinance which may lead to absurd
application." 8 The basic standard of judicial review concerning
actions of home rule municipalities will be the state statutes and not
the state constitution."19  Home rule municipalities, and
particularly city attorneys, will be confused between the more
liberal home rule language of the constitution, statutes, charters,
and ordinances, and the more traditional interpretation of that
116. 294 N.W.2d at 632.
117. Id. at 630. A narrow interpretation of Litten would result from citing the case only as
precedent for an issue similar to the immediate issue the Litten court addressed: "May a home rule
city, independent of the general laws relating to cities, select its own form of government and decree
its own procedure for changing the form of government .. " Id. A broad reading would result from
using the case as precedent in future litigation concerning any general or particular issue of home
rule. Id. at 634.
118. Id. at 633. It is at least worthy of observation that, pragmatically, every application of an
ordinance or charter provision has potential for exercises in absurdity.
119. Id. at 632. The distinction is between viewing a municipal corporation as a legal entity
acting unto itself with legislative force and effect, or viewing it traditionally as the mere instrument of
the legislature in local affairs. Compare Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373-74.
According to Schwabacher, the question before the courts should no longer be:
[wihether a local government unit is authorized to exercise power. but whether it is
torbidden to do so. . . . It is hoped that local governments will be more successful
defending their exercise of initiative in court when the constitution places the burden
on their opponents to prove they are not authorized to act, rather than on the localities
to prove they are authorized to act.
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language by the courts. 120
One could speculate that had the Litten court dealt with the
constitutional question called for under section 130 of the North
Dakota Constitution,1 21  the result under the devolution test
122
would have been the same. However, the means of obtaining the
result would have been by addressing and interpreting section 130.
Future decisions in this area may in fact reach the same result using
the devolution test, for that appears to be the only way future courts
could reach the constitutional issues while remaining consistent
with Litten's holding.
The impact of Litten v. City of Fargo appears to be that, despite
the very liberal language of section 130 of the North Dakota
Constitution, and despite the enabling statutes, the courts are at
least hesitant to allow real new formula home rule to North Dakota
municipalities or to recognize the fact of the delegation of real
legislative power to such cities absent specific enumeration by
statute. 123 Our unique North Dakota idea as to home rule has been
forced into traditional home rule perceptions. 12
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120. See McQuttLtIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 7, at § 1.43. It is
submitted that an interesting paradox can be observed between the conservative interest of the
judiciary in maintaining a traditional approach to home rule and the traditionally conservative idea
that what is done best is done locally. Id.
121. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Web, supra note 6, at 373-74. The constitutional question
would address the distinction between traditional home rule interpretations of the constitution and
new formula home rule interpretations as outlined by Dean Fordham. Id. Note that section 130 of the
North Dakota Constitution adopts the Fordhan approach. See N .D. CoNs'r. art. VI, § 130 (currently
codilied at N.D. CONST. art. VII. § 1). The text of section 130 appears at supra note 6.
122. See Schwabacber. The Seamless JVeb, supra note 6. at 374-76. The devolution test asks what
powers the state may constitutionally devolve. Id.
123. 294 N.W.2d tt 632.
124. See Schwabacher, The Seamless Bleb, supra note 6, at 373-74.
